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Insights from Chinese Writings
Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein
n 26 October 2006, a Chinese Song-class attack submarine reportedly 
surfaced in close proximity to the USS Kitty Hawk carrier battle group in 
international waters near Okinawa.1 This was not the fi rst time that Chinese sub-
marines have attracted extensive media attention. The advent of the Yuan-class 
SSK in mid-2004 seems to have had a major impact in transforming the assess-
ments of Western naval analysts, and also of the broader community of analysts 
studying China’s military modernization.
In order to grasp the energy that China is now committing to undersea war-
fare, consider that during 2002–2004 China’s navy launched thirteen submarines 
while simultaneously undertaking the purchase of submarines from Russia on an 
unprecedented scale.2 Indeed, China commissioned thirty-one new submarines 
between 1995 and 2005.3 Given this rapid evolution, appraisals of China’s capa-
bility to fi eld competent and lethal diesel submarines in the littorals have slowly 
changed from ridicule to grudging respect of late. China’s potential for complex 
technological development is fi nally being taken seriously abroad.
Whereas the Yuan’s debut allegedly surprised Western analysts, the emergence 
of China’s 093 SSN and 094 SSBN has been anticipated for some time. Neverthe-
less, these programs remain shrouded in mystery, and there is little consensus 
regarding their operational and strategic signifi cance. In the broadest terms, it 
can be said that a successful 093 program will signifi cantly enlarge the scope of 
Chinese submarine operations, perhaps ultimately serving as the cornerstone of 
a genuine blue-water navy. The 094 could take the survivability of China’s nuclear 
deterrent to a new level, potentially enabling more aggressive posturing by Bei-
jing in a crisis. Moreover, these platforms are entering the PLA Navy (PLAN) at a 
CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR SUBMARINE FORCE
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time when reductions are projected to occur in the U.S. Navy submarine force;4 
that fact was duly noted by a senior PLAN strategist recently in one of China’s 
premier naval journals.5
The PLA is notoriously opaque, posing major challenges for Western analysts. 
Offi cial statements regarding the intentions of China’s future nuclear submarine 
force are all but nonexistent.6 Nevertheless, one of the most signifi cant statements 
is contained in the 2004 PLA defense white paper’s discussion of naval opera-
tions. Enhancing “nuclear counterattacks” capability was described as one of the 
PLAN’s most important missions. Moreover, Chinese unoffi cial writings on de-
fense issues are voluminous and growing more so. Among dozens of journals, 
magazines, and newspapers devoted to military affairs (not to mention hundreds 
of more technically oriented publications), at least fi ve focus specifi cally on naval 
warfare.7 This article will survey the available Chinese writings concerning the 
PLAN’s future nuclear submarine force.
Two caveats are in order. First, this article seeks to present the views of Chinese 
analysts but does not render fi nal judgment on the validity of those views. Such 
an approach will better acquaint a broader community of naval analysts with the 
essential primary source materials. Second, this is not a comprehensive study but 
rather a preliminary research probe. These data need to be treated with a certain 
amount of caution, and follow-on studies are necessary before major conclusions 
can be drawn.
The article begins with a brief survey of relevant elements from Chinese writ-
ings concerning the PLAN’s nuclear submarine history. A second section exam-
ines how PLAN analysts appraise developments among foreign nuclear submarine 
forces: What lessons do they glean from these other experiences? The third sec-
tion concerns mission imperatives: What strategic and operational objectives are 
China’s 093 and 094 submarines designed to achieve? The potential capabilities 
of these submarines are addressed in this article’s fourth and fi nal section.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Chinese naval writings reveal an intense pride regarding Beijing’s naval nuclear-
propulsion program. These writings, in the “glorious genre,” as it were, are well 
documented in John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai’s groundbreaking and authori-
tative classic China’s Strategic Seapower.8 This article will not attempt to examine 
Chinese writings to check for consistency with the conclusions in the detailed 
study by Lewis and Xue (though this is a worthwhile project and should be un-
dertaken, given the wide variety of new Chinese secondary source data). Rather, 
this analysis highlights several important trends in contemporary Chinese dis-
cussions of the fi rst-generation nuclear submarines, in order to assess the pros-
pects for the next generation.
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In his recent autobiography, published in Chinese by the offi cial PLA press in 
2004, Admiral Liu Huaqing provides a unique level of detail concerning the foun-
dation for China’s contemporary development of nuclear submarines.9 Credited 
with an instrumental role in modernizing China’s navy, Admiral Liu presided 
over a steady improvement and expansion of China’s submarine force as both 
commander of the PLAN (1982–88) and vice chairman of the Central Mili-
tary Commission (1989–97). In 1984, 
Admiral Liu emphasized: “We must 
place importance on submarines at 
all times. . . . Nuclear-powered sub-
marines should be further improved 
and used as a strategic task force.”10 Liu viewed nuclear submarines not only as “a 
deterrent force of the nation” but also as “an expression of our country’s overall 
strength.” As commander of the PLA Navy, Liu emphasizes, “I paid exceptional 
attention to the practical work of developing nuclear-powered submarines. From 
1982 through 1988, I organized various experiments and training sessions in this 
regard. I also considered developing a second generation of nuclear-powered sub-
marines.”11 PLAN emphasis on submarine development continues today. As the 
2005 edition of the PLA’s fi rst authoritative English-language volume on strategy 
emphasizes, “Stealth warships and new-style submarines represent the modern 
sea battle platforms.”12
Chinese periodicals elucidate more recent factors shaping Chinese nuclear 
submarine force development. One important 2004 Chinese survey of China’s 
emerging nuclear submarine program, in the journal  (World 
Aerospace Digest), reviews a series of inadequacies in China’s submarine force 
that became starkly evident during the 1990s. According to this report, the 1993 
Yin He incident was an important event for crystallizing the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC)’s commitment to a new generation of nuclear attack submarines. 
Thus, when the Chinese freighter was inspected in Saudi Arabia before proceed-
ing to Iran, the PRC high command was apparently “extremely furious, but had 
no recourse” [ ]. At that point, the leadership redoubled 
its efforts to build a “capable and superior nuclear attack submarine that could 
protect China’s shipping in distant seas.” The author notes that “at present, our 
country only has fi ve Han-class nuclear attack submarines. . . . This number is 
insuffi cient and the capabilities are backward. . . . Thus, they are inadequate to 
cope with the requirements of the new strategic situation.”13
The 2004 memoirs of former PLAN commander Admiral Liu appear to lend 
some credence to this sequence of events as they state that the Central Military 
Commission began development work on a “new generation nuclear submarine,” 
Chinese naval strategists evidently prioritize 
analyses of the American, French, and 
especially Russian nuclear submarine fl eets.
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probably the 093, in 1994.14 “In 1990 the last [of the original fi ve Han-class SSNs] 
was launched,” Liu recalls:
After I briefed President Jiang Zemin on this, he decided to personally inspect 
the launch of this submarine. At the time of inspection, he said resolutely: “De-
velopment of nuclear-powered submarines cannot be discontinued.” On 29 May 
1992, when forwarding the Navy’s report on building nuclear-powered submarine 
units to President Jiang, I particularly stressed the need to continually develop 
scientifi c research and perform successful safety work. President Jiang wrote a 
note on the report, giving his important instructions on this matter. Based on 
his instructions, in the course of developing nuclear-powered submarines, we 
formed a seamless and effective nuclear safety mechanism by drawing on the 
experience of foreign countries while taking our practical situation into account. 
The mechanism included regulations and rules, technological controls, and 
supervisory and examination measures. In 1994, in compliance with President 
Jiang’s instructions, the Central Military Commission and its Special Commit-
tee adopted a decision to start developing a new generation of nuclear-powered 
submarines. Seeing that there were qualifi ed personnel to carry on the cause and 
that new types of submarines would continue to be developed, I felt relieved.15
The above analysis in  (World Aerospace Digest), however, 
does cut against what appears to be conventional wisdom in China’s naval litera-
ture, which tends to credit China’s Han submarines with a signifi cant role in the 
1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. Thus, one report states that in mid-March 1996, “U.S. 
military satellites were unable to detect the position of [certain] Chinese nuclear 
submarines; it was as if they . . . had vanished.” This narrative continues, “The 
U.S. carrier battle groups were unable to cope with the hidden, mobile, high-
speed, undersea” threat posed by the Chinese nuclear submarines, and thus “were 
unable to approach the sea area within 200 nautical miles of Taiwan.” Implying 
some uncertainty on this issue, the author asks, “Why did the U.S. carrier group 
suddenly change its original plan? Was it that they feared China’s nuclear sub-
marines?”16 Another PRC report also alleges that American military satellites lost 
track of China’s SSNs and that the U.S. Navy was forced to retreat when confront-
ed by the “massive threat of China’s nuclear submarine force.”17 Given the Han-
class SSN’s reputation as a noisy vessel, these statements might well be viewed 
with suspicion—and, indeed, they are not reproduced here to imply their truth.18 
Nonetheless, these Chinese conjectures are related above because they could be 
indicative of the context within which 093 and 094 development has occurred.
Most China scholars agree that the intellectual space for debate and disagree-
ment in China is, and has for some time been, rather wide. In this respect, the 
analysis from  (World Aerospace Digest) is once again note-
worthy. While the vast majority of PLAN writings concerning the single Type 
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092 Xia SSBN heap praise on China’s technical achievements, this analysis breaks 
new ground (in the PRC context) by drawing attention to the Xia’s inadequacies. 
It notes candidly, “The Xia-class actually is not a genuine deterrent capability.” 
Noting the symbolic value of the vessel, the author explains that the Xia was 
important to answer the question of “having or not having” a nuclear subma-
rine but then enumerates the platform’s numerous problems: high noise levels 
and radiation leakage, not to mention the short range of the single warhead car-
ried by China’s fi rst-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), 
the Julang-1. Forced to approach the enemy’s shores and vulnerable to enemy 
ASW, the Xia “cannot possibly serve as a viable nuclear, second-strike force.” It is 
no wonder, the author explains, that China did not opt to build a “whole batch” 
of these problematic submarines.19 No doubt, such candid observations suggest 
that Chinese strategists do not necessarily overestimate the capabilities of their 
fi rst-generation nuclear submarines, perhaps adding additional impetus to the 
building of a second generation.
Even more important than the observations concerning history cited above, 
however, are the views of China’s “founding fathers” of naval nuclear propulsion. 
Two of these founding fathers recently offered interviews to the press in which 
they expounded on the outlook for nuclear submarines in naval warfare. First, 
Peng Shilu, designer of China’s fi rst naval nuclear reactor, was interviewed 
in  (World Outlook) in 2002. Although Peng drafted his fi rst reactor 
designs more than three decades ago, this engineer is unwavering in his commit-
ment: “In the First World War, the battleship was the most important vessel; and 
in the Second World War, it was the aircraft carrier. [But in] the future, I believe 
the most critical naval asset will be the nuclear submarine.” For Peng, the SSN’s 
primary strengths are high power, high speed, large carrying capacity for equip-
ment and personnel, and extended deployment capability, as well as excellent 
concealment possibilities. According to Peng, “Nuclear submarines can go any-
where. . . . [T]heir scope of operations is vast [and they are therefore] most appro-
priate to meet the security requirements of a great power.”20 Drawing on another 
interview with Peng Shilu, an analysis published in 2005 by China’s Central Party 
School Press concludes: “[Such is] the huge superiority of nuclear propulsion 
[that it] simply cannot be compared with conventional propulsion.”21
An interview with the Han submarine’s chief designer, Huang Xuhua, which 
appeared in the military periodical  (Ordnance Knowledge) in 2000 is 
more explicit regarding some of the dilemmas confronting China’s naval nuclear 
propulsion program. Huang discusses the conundrum for naval strategists posed 
by the option to choose between development of AIP (air-independent propul-
sion) technology and nuclear propulsion. The interviewer asks Huang directly 
whether it makes sense to continue with nuclear propulsion development, given 
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recent worldwide advances in AIP technology. Huang points out that nuclear 
propulsion offers far more power, is likely much safer and more reliable, and en-
ables submarines to stay submerged for longer periods of time. Taking Sweden’s 
Gotland-class AIP-equipped submarine as an example, he suggests that this sub-
marine’s two weeks of submerged operations at an average speed of four knots 
might not “be adequate for combat requirements.” Huang accepts that certain 
bathymetric conditions are ideal for AIP-equipped diesel submarines, such as 
those prevailing in the Baltic Sea (a small, shallow body of water). For Sweden, 
therefore, Huang says, “It is scientifi cally logical to select this type of submarine.” 
The implicit argument, however, is that China confronts rather different, if not 
wholly unrelated, maritime challenges and requirements.
In making an argument for Chinese nuclear submarine development, Huang 
draws a parallel to Britain’s deployment of SSNs during the Falklands War. He 
notes that their high speed was critical to their success in deploying to a distant 
theater in a timely fashion. Indeed, other PRC naval analysts have been impressed 
by the sea-control capabilities that British SSNs afforded during this scenario—
the most intense naval combat since the Second World War.22 Huang then makes 
the observation that such high-speed submarines are critical for a nation, such as 
the United Kingdom, that—in contrast to the United States—no longer possesses 
a global network of bases.23 For the PRC, which takes great pride in its lack of 
overseas bases, this would appear to be an argument for SSNs serving as the basis 
of a blue-water navy with considerable reach. Indeed, writing in China’s most 
prestigious military publication,  (China Military Science), PLAN 
Senior Captain Xu Qi goes so far as to state that China’s “navy must . . . unceas-
ingly move toward [the posture of] a ‘blue-water navy’ [and] expand the scope of 
maritime strategic defense.”24
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
The Falklands War is hardly the only naval campaign of interest to Chinese strate-
gists, as PRC researchers produce an extraordinary volume of analyses concerned 
with modern naval warfare—often generated by carefully dissecting foreign sec-
ondary sources. There is a large appetite for information regarding the United 
Kingdom’s history of nuclear submarine operations and even that of such na-
scent nuclear submarine powers as India.25 However, Chinese naval strategists 
evidently prioritize analyses of the American, French, and especially Russian 
nuclear submarine fl eets.
From a very early stage, PRC engineers demonstrated concretely that they were 
not averse to adopting American designs, as they conspicuously embraced the 
“teardrop” confi guration for their fi rst generation of nuclear submarines, in con-
trast to then-current Soviet designs.26 Today the “threat” component is also evident 
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in PLAN analyses of the U.S. submarine force. Chinese researchers display inti-
mate familiarity with all U.S. Navy submarine force programs, including the most 
cutting-edge platforms, such as Seawolf and Virginia.27 Additionally, there is great 
interest in the ongoing transformation of some SSBNs into SSGNs.28 Ample focus 
is also devoted to the capabilities of the Los Angeles class as the backbone of the 
U.S. Navy submarine force.29 Beyond platforms and programs, there is also a keen 
interest in America’s industrial organization for nuclear submarine production 
and maintenance.30
Chinese analysts closely monitor French nuclear submarine development as 
well.31 They have paid particular attention to the manner in which France strives 
to maximize the effectiveness of its second-tier nuclear submarine force.32 The 
September 2005 issue of  (Naval and Merchant Ships) features a lengthy 
report, apparently by a Chinese naval offi cer studying in France who has made 
several visits to French nuclear submarines based in Brest. This report makes 
note of numerous details, from the vast support network at the base to France’s 
inclination to support a high quality of life aboard its nuclear vessels. Concerning 
the value of France’s SSBN force, which is noted to constitute “80% of France’s 
nuclear weaponry,” the author quotes a French military expert as saying, “France’s 
SSBNs ensure national security, carry out strategic nuclear deterrence and [have] 
basic power for independent national defense.” Other issues highlighted in this 
report include personnel practices (e.g., age limitations, two crews per subma-
rine), operations cycles (a two/two/two pattern for SSBNs that matches other 
Chinese discussions—see below), command and control arrangements, quieting 
technologies, and the small size of certain classes of French SSNs.33
It is with the Russian nuclear submarine force, however, that the Chinese 
navy feels the greatest affi nity. This is not surprising and springs from historical, 
strategic, and perhaps even organizational-cultural affi nities that appear to have 
been cemented since the passing of Sino-Soviet enmity in the late 1980s. Chinese 
analysts are well aware of the crisis that the Russian nuclear submarine force has 
suffered in recent years. They have written extensively on the Kursk tragedy and 
other accidents.34 For instance, one source has documented the great embarrass-
ment suffered during an SLBM test failure that was witnessed directly by Rus-
sian president Vladimir Putin in early 2004.35 Chinese analysts note the vastly 
decreased building rate for Soviet nuclear submarines and voice concern lest the 
legacy force be insuffi cient to contend with [ ] the United States.36
Nevertheless, respect for Russian nuclear submarine achievements has not di-
minished signifi cantly.37 A review of Soviet naval development that appeared in 
 (China Military Science) in 1999 extolled the virtues of nuclear 
submarines: “Relying on nuclear submarines, the Soviet Union rapidly overcame 
the unfavorable geostrategic situation, giving the USSR an ocean going navy with 
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offensive capability.”38 Perhaps refl ecting on internal debates in China regarding 
naval modernization, the author also described how the Russian naval develop-
ment encountered a major obstacle from a faction adhering to the notion that 
“navies have no use in the nuclear age” [ ].
Refl ecting on today’s Russian navy,  (Modern Navy) lavished praise 
on the capabilities of a refurbished Typhoon-class SSBN, Dmitry Donskoy, that 
was re-launched in 2002;39 it also hailed the 2001 launch of an Akula-class SSN, 
Gepard, which is described as the world’s quietest nuclear submarine. The lat-
ter report also noted that Gepard 
has twenty-four nuclear-armed 
cruise missiles.40 In a “war game” 
(of unknown origin) modeling a 
Russian-Japanese naval confl ict, 
which was reported on in considerable detail in the October and November 2002 
issues of  (Naval and Merchant Ships), the Russian nuclear submarine 
force overcame Japan’s ASW forces and infl icted grave losses (thirteen ships sunk) 
on the Japanese navy.41 This would appear to be a subtle argument that China also 
requires a substantial fl eet of SSNs.
In Chinese naval periodicals, the affi nity with the Russian nuclear submarine 
force is manifested by vast coverage of the minutest details of historical and con-
temporary platforms. In 2004–2005, for example, the journal  (Naval 
and Merchant Ships) carried ten-to-fi fteen-page special features, each devoted to 
outlining the development of a single class, such as the Victor, Delta, Oscar, or 
Alpha, complete with photo essays and detailed line drawings.42 These features 
are suggestive of the volumes of data that have been made available over the last 
decade from the Russian side and, simultaneously, the voracious appetite for such 
information within China’s naval studies community. Among such descriptions, 
perhaps no Russian submarine commands as much respect and interest as the 
massive Typhoon. Chinese analysts are captivated not only by this vessel’s gar-
gantuan proportions but also by the effi ciency of its reactors, its impressive quiet-
ing characteristics, the attention to crew living standards, and its command and 
control equipment and procedures.43 Evidently Chinese naval analysts appear to 
comprehend the strategic signifi cance of a platform that could strike adversary 
targets from the “Russian-dominated Barents and Okhotsk seas.”44
Western analysts have followed Russian arms transfers to China with an all-
consuming interest. But the above discussions imply that one should not under-
estimate the transfer of “software” and expertise that has occurred in parallel with 
that of the hardware. The true dimensions of these intellectual transfers remain 
unknown.
Chinese unoffi cial writings on defense 
issues are voluminous and growing more so.
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MISSION IMPERATIVES
PRC writings concerning nuclear submarines do not hide the symbolic role of 
these vessels. One, for example, remarks on the precise correlation between mem-
bership in the UN Security Council and the development of nuclear submarines.45 
Indeed, it appears to be conventional wisdom in the PRC that nuclear submarines 
represent one of China’s clearest claims to status as a great power [ ].46 In 1989, 
after China’s successful test of the JL-1 SLBM, Admiral Liu, then vice chairman of 
the Central Military Commission, stated,
Chairman Mao said that “we will build a nuclear submarine even if it takes 10,000 
years.” . . . Our nuclear submarine [and its] stealthy nuclear missile both succeed-
ed. This has [had] strong international repercussions. As Comrade Deng Xiaoping 
has said, if we did not have atomic bombs, missiles, [and] satellites, then we would 
not [enjoy] our present international status, and could not shape international 
great triangle relations [as a balancer to the Soviet Union]. Developing strategic 
nuclear weapons has therefore [had] great strategic signifi cance for the nation.47
Beyond symbolism, however, what are the missions that Chinese strategists 
envision for the second generation of PLAN nuclear submarines?
In general, nuclear submarines are credited with having signifi cant advantages 
over conventional submarines: “a large cruising radius, strong self-power [i.e., 
electrical power supply], high underwater speed, great diving depth, [relative] 
quietness and large weapons carrying capacity.”48 Perceived advantages of con-
ventional submarines include “small volume, low noise, low cost, and mobility.”49 
Underscoring the cost differential, an anonymous PLAN offi cer is cited as warn-
ing, “The price of one nuclear submarine can buy several, even more than ten, 
conventional submarines. . . . As a developing country, our nation’s military bud-
get is still quite low, and thus the size of the navy’s nuclear submarine fl eet can 
only be maintained at a basic scale” [ ].50
In 1989 Admiral Liu declared, “I believe that there are two issues in developing 
nuclear submarines: one is the development of SSBNs, and one is the develop-
ment of SSNs. Both types of nuclear submarines should be developed, especially 
SSNs. Along with technological development, enemy ASW power has strength-
ened. Originally, using conventional submarines was suffi cient to accomplish 
[our] missions, but now that has become problematic, [so] we must develop 
SSNs.”51
To understand what strategic roles the 093 submarine might undertake, it 
is essential to return to the discussion initiated by both Peng Shilu and Huang 
Xuhua in the fi rst part of this article concerning the particular tactical and op-
erational advantages of nuclear submarines. Indeed, the sophistication of PLA 
thinking on these issues is underlined by Huang’s analysis of the different roles 
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played by SSNs for each side during the Cold War. For the Americans, he says, 
they were a vital element of “global attack strategy” ( ). For the So-
viets, by contrast, their roles were to stalk enemy carrier battle groups, as well as 
to defend Soviet ballistic missile submarines.52 Concurring with Peng and Huang, 
a third analysis from  (National Defense) enumerates further advantages of 
nuclear submarines by emphasizing the all-important factor of the SSN’s im-
pressive power supply. Not to be underestimated, this supply of power can vastly 
improve the crew’s quality of life (e.g., by providing for strong air conditioning) 
and support electronic combat systems. In terms of combat performance, it is 
said that SSNs can employ their speed to foil ASW attack and are built solidly to 
absorb battle damage.53
A consistent theme in PRC writings concerning SSNs involves their ability to 
undertake long-range missions of extended duration. Consistent with the analy-
sis above that described the 1993 Yin He incident as lending signifi cant impetus 
for the 093 program, a recent discussion of China’s nuclear submarine force in 
 (Naval and Merchant Ships) refers to the enormous growth in China’s 
maritime trade as a factor in shaping China’s emerging nuclear submarine strat-
egy.54 Likewise, another article from  (Modern Ships) on PRC submarine 
strategy suggests, “Submarines are the PLAN’s main long-distance sea force. . . . 
Protecting China’s sea lines of communication has become an important aspect 
of maritime security. This is an important new mission for the PLAN.”55 If nucle-
ar submarines can “break through the island chain blockade” [ ], 
they can conduct long-distance operations without hindrance from the enemy’s 
airborne ASW. Nuclear submarines are said to be far superior to diesel-powered 
submarines in combat situations in which air cover is lacking—a recognized vul-
nerability of the PLAN in distant operations. But overall, there is a strong em-
phasis on the imperative for Chinese nuclear submarines to function in a joint 
environment, thereby complementing other PLA strengths.56
Nevertheless, these same analyses also exhibit some conservatism—for exam-
ple, suggesting explicitly that China’s new nuclear submarines will not operate 
beyond China’s “second island chain” (running from the Japanese archipelago 
south to the Bonin and Marianas Islands and fi nally to the Palau group).57 In-
deed, nuclear submarines are also said to be critical in the struggle to establish 
sea control [ ] in the littoral regions and in China’s neighboring seas. The 
linkage between the 093 program and the Taiwan issue (as suggested above) is 
fairly clear: “In order to guarantee the required national defense strength and to 
safeguard the completion of national unifi cation and to prevent ‘Taiwan inde-
pendence,’ over the past few years, China has increased indigenous production of 
new conventional and nuclear submarines” (emphasis added).58 There is not only 
an acceleration of the building rate but also a change in the pattern of submarine 
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development: “China’s construction of a new generation of nuclear-powered at-
tack submarines breaks with past practice, in which China would fi rst build one 
vessel, debug it repeatedly, and then begin small batch production. In this case, 
work on the later submarines began almost simultaneously with work on the 
fi rst. . . . China is doing it differently this time . . . because of the urgency of the 
surrounding situation.”59 Consistent with the Taiwan scenario hinted at above, it 
is said that China’s nuclear submarines will be ideal for attacking a likely enemy’s 
lengthy seaborne supply lines.60
Disturbingly, one article actually does raise the possibility of a long-range land 
attack and even a nuclear-strategic role for China’s future SSN.61 But it is the 094 
SSBN, of course, that is envisioned to have the primary role in the nuclear-strike/
deterrence mission. Indeed, the same analysis suggests that, in contrast to Russia, 
China is planning to base a higher proportion—as many as half—of its nuclear 
warheads on submarines.62 Another source states that Chinese “SSBNs, [which] 
already possess appropriate nuclear counterattack capability, are an important 
embodiment of national strategic nuclear deterrence.”63
One Chinese expert identifi es bathymetry as infl uencing SSBN development 
and deployment. He suggests that countries with shallow coastal waters on a con-
tinental shelf (such as China) face strong incentives to develop smaller SSBNs in 
order to better operate in local conditions.64 Among the reasons cited by Chinese 
strategists for continuing development of their nation’s SSBN program are the 
inherent stealth and mobility of the submarine, which combine to make it the 
“most survivable type of (nuclear) weapon” [ ]. The PLAN is 
pursuing the 094, therefore, in order to guarantee via deterrence that mainland 
China is not struck by nuclear weapons and “to make sure, in the context of 
regional war, to prevent direct intervention by a third party” [ ’ ’
]. In this analysis, China’s nuclear forces are viewed as critical to 
deterring Washington in a Taiwan scenario, and the author is unusually candid: 
“At present, our country’s nuclear deterrent forces are insuffi cient; [therefore] 
the potential for U.S. military intervention in a cross-Strait confl ict is extremely 
high.”65 Another source, citing China’s development of the 094 submarine, em-
phasizes that “if a war erupts across the Taiwan Strait one day, facing the danger 
of China waging nuclear war, it will be very diffi cult for America to intervene in 
the cross-strait military crisis.”66
Another PRC analysis draws a direct link between the 094 and U.S. missile 
defense capabilities. It proposes: “In the face of the continual upgrade of the U.S. 
theater missile system and the excited U.S. research and development of all sorts 
of new antimissile systems, of course we cannot stand by idly and watch. . . . We 
must . . . [adopt] countermeasures. The most important of these countermea-
sures is to exert great effort in developing new types of nuclear-powered strategic 
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missile submarines which are more capable of penetrating defenses.” Failure to 
do so, according to these authors, will increase the likelihood that “the opponent’s 
nuclear cudgel may some day come crashing down on the heads of the children 
of the Yellow Emperor.”67
A somewhat more subtle justifi cation for the 094 makes the argument in quasi-
 legalistic terms. Since China currently has a no-fi rst-use policy for its nuclear 
forces, it is said to require the most survivable type of nuclear weapons (i.e., 
SSBN-based). The same analysis cautions that there is no need to build SSBNs in 
the excessive numbers that characterized the Cold War at sea. Rather, China will 
seek a “balanced” [ ] nuclear force (both land and sea-based), just as it will 
seek a balanced navy.68
There appears to be some recognition that an effective sea-based deterrent 
hinges on more than stealthy second-generation nuclear submarines. A student 
at China’s Central Party School cautions that unless the PLAN “possess[es] the 
ability to control passage in and out of important strategic passages in times of 
crisis. . . . In wartime, it is possible that PLAN vessels might suffer enclosure, 
pursuit, blocking, and interception by the enemy. Besieged in the offshore waters, 
[China’s] sea-based nuclear deterrent could be greatly reduced.”69
CAPABILITIES
For Western analysts, the most important details concerning the 093 and 094 
submarines involve their projected deployment numbers and capabilities. Here 
the authors will examine both Chinese naval writings and related technical re-
search to suggest a range of possibilities. It bears repeating that we do not endorse 
the estimates offered below but are merely presenting the data for other scholars 
and analysts to consider.
A major theme of Chinese writings is that while China cannot yet build subma-
rines that meet advanced Western standards in all respects, it is intent on building 
successful 093 and 094 submarines. According to one source, “The technology 
involved is relatively mature.”70 The situation is strikingly different from that sur-
rounding China’s fi rst generation of nuclear submarines, which were built in the 
1960s and 1970s when China was unstable, impoverished, isolated, and techno-
logically backward. One author cites China’s “successful economic reforms” over 
the “past twenty years” and the accompanying “technological progress” as pro-
viding the necessary expertise and adequate “resources” for successful nuclear 
submarine development.71 China is fi nally poised to capitalize on its decades of 
experience with related development and manufacturing processes.72 Because 
of these advances, China’s new nuclear submarines will not necessarily be cop-
ies of either American or Russian submarines but rather products of an indig-
enous Chinese effort that is informed by foreign “best of breed” technologies and 
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practices. Nor will Chinese nuclear submarines necessarily be used in the same 
roles for which U.S. and Soviet submarines were optimized (e.g., antisubmarine 
warfare).73
The actual number of 093 and 094 submarines that China constructs and de-
ploys will offer insight into its naval and nuclear strategies. One Chinese source 
suggests that by 2010, China will fi eld a total of six 094 SSBNs, divided into pa-
trolling, deploying, and refi tting groups.74 Consistent with this projection, an-
other source suggests that these groups will comprise two SSBNs each.75
Another critical question concerns the 093 and 094 submarines’ acoustic 
properties. Chinese sources universally recognize that noise reduction is one of 
the greatest challenges in building an effective nuclear submarine.76 PRC scien-
tists have long been conducting research concerning the fundamental sources of 
propeller noise. For instance, experts at China Ship Scientifi c Research Center 
developed a relatively advanced guide-vane propeller by the late 1990s.77 This, 
and the fact that China already has advanced seven-blade propellers with cru-
ciform vortex dissipaters on its indigenous Song-class and imported Kilo-class 
diesel submarines, suggests that the 093 and 094 will have signifi cantly improved 
propellers. A researcher in Qingdao’s 4808 Factory also demonstrates Chinese at-
tention to the need to use sound-isolation couplings to prevent transmission of 
vibrations to the ocean from major fresh-water circulating pumps in the steam 
cycle.78 Advanced composite materials are credited with capability to absorb vi-
brations and sound.79
One Chinese researcher states that the 093 is not as quiet as the U.S. Seawolf 
class or Virginia class but is on a par with the improved Los Angeles class.80 An-
other analyst estimates that the 093’s noise level has been reduced to that of the 
Russian Akula-class submarine at 110 decibels [ ].81 He states that the 094’s 
acoustic signature has been reduced to 120 decibels. According to this report, this 
is defi nitely not equal to that of the Ohio class, but is on a par with the Los Angeles.82 
There is no additional information given to evaluate concerning the origins or 
comparability of these “data.”
It is conceivable, if unlikely, that the PRC has achieved a major scientifi c feat 
concerning the propulsion system for nuclear submarines. A wide variety of Chi-
nese sources claim that China has succeeded in developing a high-temperature 
gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) [ ] suitable for use in its new- generation 
nuclear submarines. This development is described as a “revolutionary break-
through” [ ].83 Another source elaborates: “HTGR is the most ad-
vanced in the world, [its] volume is small, [its] power is great, [its] noise is low—it 
is the most ideal propulsion system for a new generation of nuclear submarines. 
The United States and Russia have both not achieved a breakthrough in this re-
gard. According to Western reports, in the fi rst half of 2000, China successfully 
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installed an HTGR on a nuclear submarine. If this information is true, the 093 
uses this advanced propulsion technology.”84
This same analyst suggests that the need to incorporate the new HTGR ex-
plains why 093 development has stretched out over a number of years.85 HTGR 
development is indeed cited as a major component of China’s 863 High Technol-
ogy Plan [863 ] to develop selected key technologies.86 The Institute 
of Nuclear Energy Technology (INET) at Qinghua University has constructed a 
ten-megawatt HTGR, known as HTR 10.87 Qinghua and MIT signed a collabora-
tive HTGR research agreement in 2003.88 The chief scientist and offi ce director in 
charge of energy technology development for China’s 863 Plan write that HTR 
10’s “high level results” make it “one of the most promising fourth generation 
systems.”89 In the area of nuclear reactor design, construction, and components, 
robust indigenous research has been supplemented by extensive technological 
assistance from such Western corporations as Westinghouse.90
As implied above, some Chinese analysts believe that the HTGR promises to 
give PLAN submarines unprecedented maximum speed.91 China’s Han subma-
rines, by contrast, are said to have a maximum speed of twenty-fi ve knots, while 
the Xia has a maximum surface speed of sixteen knots and underwater speed of 
twenty-two knots.92 As mentioned before, however, Huang Xuhua believes that 
submarine speed is less important than concealment, which in turn depends on 
minimizing a submarine’s acoustic signature.93 Another possible benefi t of ad-
vanced nuclear propulsion is increased reactor safety.
Despite the above speculation, there are substantial reasons to doubt that Chi-
na would be willing or able to put such an immature technology in its second 
generation of nuclear submarines, as this would constitute a substantial risk on 
the investment. Moreover, as Shawn Cappellano-Sarver points out, “The techni-
cal diffi culties that would have to be overcome with the blowers (the need for 
magnetic bearings) and the fuel loading system to make an HTGR compatible 
with a submarine are formidable. This makes the probability of the 093 being 
equipped with an HTGR small.”94
As for armaments, the same analyst states that the 093 submarine may be 
equipped with “Eagle Strike” YJ-12 [ -12] supersonic antiship cruise mis-
siles.95 The YJ-12 has been developed as part of a larger Chinese quest for im-
proved cruise missiles, particularly submarine-launched variants.96 The PLAN is 
presently working to equip “attack submarines with long distance, supersonic, 
low altitude missile travel, high accuracy, and strong anti-interference anti-ship 
missiles, with the combat capability to attack enemy surface ships from mid- to 
long-range.”97
The 093 is said to have sixty-fi ve-centimeter torpedo tubes.98 In his interview, 
Huang discusses the engineering issues associated with torpedo tube diameter, 
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explaining that “wider tubes support superior torpedoes and are not for . . . mis-
siles or sound-dampening.”99 As for the number of missile tubes in the 094, two 
sources predict sixteen tubes, compared with the Xia’s twelve.100 A third source 
forecasts between twelve and sixteen tubes.101
Admiral Liu Huaqing has recounted China’s initial failure and ultimately suc-
cessful (on 12 October 1982) effort to test launch the JL-1, or CSS-N-3, SLBM 
from a submerged Golf-class submarine. This made China the fi fth nation to 
have an undersea nuclear capability. “Launching carrier rockets from underwater 
has remarkable advantages, compared with using land-based or airborne strate-
gic nuclear weapons,” Liu emphasizes. “This is because the launching platform . . . 
has a wide maneuver space and is well concealed. This gives it better survivability 
and, hence, greater deterrent power.”102 The JL-1 was test-fi red successfully from 
the Xia on 15 September 1988.103 According to one PRC analyst, “China believes 
that although the U.S. thinks the Xia-class submarine is too noisy and easy to 
detect, the Chinese navy is capable of going into the Pacifi c without detection 
because of its special tactics.”104
The 094’s JL-2 SLBM is projected to have a range of eight thousand kilome-
ters, compared to 2,700 kilometers for the JL-1.105 There is also speculation that, 
in contrast to JL-1, JL-2 will have multiple independently targeted reentry ve-
hicles (MIRVs). This 
would enhance nuclear 
deterrence by increas-
ing China’s number of 
undersea warheads and 
signifi cantly bolstering 
their chances of penetrating an American national missile defense. One Chinese 
source predicts that each JL-2 SLBM will carry three to six warheads.106 Another 
article makes the extremely ambitious claim that JL-2s already carry six to nine 
warheads each and in the future will carry fourteen to seventeen.107
The question of how Beijing will communicate with its newly modernized 
submarine fl eet constitutes a major operational challenge.108 If China emulates 
other submarine powers, it is likely to pursue total redundancy for submarine 
command and control, relying on multiple means employing different physical 
principles. Extremely low frequency (ELF) communications have the advantage 
that messages can be received at depths of two to three hundred meters, thereby 
maximizing submarine stealth and survivability. There are major problems with 
ELF in practice, however, and it is not clear that China has mastered this technol-
ogy. Most submarine communications are conducted across a range of frequen-
cies, from very low frequency to extremely high frequency. Submarines receive 
messages through exposed antennas while at periscope depth, or via fl oating or 
Appraisals of China’s capability to fi eld competent 
and lethal diesel submarines in the littorals have slowly 
changed from ridicule to grudging respect of late.
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slightly submerged antennas while near the surface. China might, therefore, cre-
ate a dedicated maritime aircraft squadron for communications with its subma-
rine fl eet, if it has not already done so. A lengthy profi le in  (Naval and 
Merchant Ships) of the U.S. TACAMO (“Take Charge and Move Out”) air fl eet, 
which supports American SSBN operations, may buttress the general conclusion 
that Beijing is determined to perfect its communications with its submarine fl eet 
as it launches a new generation of nuclear vessels.109
The SSBN communications issue is especially acute, but China has been grap-
pling with this particular problem for more than two decades. According to Ad-
miral Liu, China on 16 April 1984 used “the satellite communications system 
for our nuclear-powered submarines to test the channels” of the Dong Fang Hong-2 
communications satellite, which had been launched eight days before. “The navy’s 
satellite communication system for its nuclear-powered submarines was the fi rst 
one to open a test communication line with the satellite,” Admiral Liu reports. 
“The success of the nuclear-powered submarine’s experiment on instantaneous 
transmission of messages via the satellite . . . pushed China’s submarine commu-
nication to a new level.”110
Centralization is arguably essential for SSBN command and control, partic-
ularly in the highly centralized PLA. According to John Wilson Lewis and Xue 
Litai, China’s SSBN force, like all other nuclear units, is overseen by the Strategic 
Forces Bureau. This arrangement is intended to ensure that “only the [Central 
Military Commission] Chairman—not China’s president—has the authority to 
launch any nuclear weapons after getting the concurrence of the Politburo Stand-
ing Committee and the [Central Military Commission].”111
However, it is unclear to what extent centralized SSBN command, control, and 
communication (C3) would be technologically possible for China. “At present 
China’s communications infrastructure is vulnerable to a fi rst strike,” Garth Hekler, 
Ed Francis, and James Mulvenon contend. “As a result, the SSBN commander 
would require explicit and restrictive rules of engagement and . . . targeting data, 
lest crisis communications with Beijing reveal [the SSBN’s] position to hostile 
attack submarines or if the submarine is cut off from Beijing after a decapitating 
fi rst strike.” On the broader question of submarine force command and control 
doctrine, it is suggested, “While the PLAN may recognize the effectiveness of de-
centralized C3 for certain types of submarine missions, it appears to be seeking to 
create a more tightly centralized submarine C3 system by developing command 
automation, network centric warfare strategies, and advanced communications 
technologies.”112
Chinese naval planners realize that rapidly improving equipment is useless 
without corresponding improvement in human performance. The PLAN has for 
some time been pursuing nuclear submarine missions of extended duration. In 
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his recently published memoirs, Admiral Liu relates that he raised the priority of 
long-duration exercises for PLAN nuclear submarines in order to test all param-
eters of these new capabilities.113
Apparently as part of these expanded activities, the current PLAN chief of 
staff, Sun Jianguo, reportedly commanded Han 403 during a mid-1980s mission 
of ninety days that broke the eighty-four-day undersea endurance record previ-
ously set by USS Nautilus.114 Chinese military medical journals evince a very clear 
interest in undersea medicine, especially issues surrounding physical and psycho-
logical challenges related to lengthy submerged missions.115
An even more important challenge for nuclear submarine effectiveness is 
maintaining a cadre of quality technical personnel. According to one Chinese 
source, “The greatest problem facing submarine forces today is: it is diffi cult to 
have skilled technical operators; especially offi cers, because they must have good 
nuclear reactor equipment maintenance and repair skills.”116
Chinese analysts acknowledge that America has long been dominant in undersea 
warfare, especially after the Cold War.117 Many Westerners are therefore surprised 
that China would have the temerity to challenge the United States directly in this 
specialized domain of warfare. Yet PLAN analysts keep close tabs on U.S. Navy 
submarine building rates and carefully probe for potential American submarine 
force vulnerabilities.118 They have studied the 8 January 2005 accident involving 
USS San Francisco with great interest.119 A 2006 article by a senior PLAN strate-
gist suggests that “China already exceeds [U.S. submarine production] fi ve times 
over” and that eighteen U.S. Navy submarines based in the Pacifi c might be at a 
severe disadvantage against seventy-fi ve or more Chinese submarines.120 While 
these assessments are ultimately attributed to an American source, the PLAN 
analyst makes no effort to deny or reject these assessments.
It is widely held that the trajectory of Chinese nuclear propulsion may be one 
of the best single indicators of whether or not China has ambitions to become a 
genuine global military power.121 With no need to surface in order to recharge bat-
teries or any requirement for refueling, not to mention unparalleled survivability 
if acoustically advanced and properly operated, nuclear submarines remain ideal 
platforms for persistent operations in far-fl ung sea areas. They will form an effi -
cient means for China to project power should it choose to do so. Available infor-
mation on Chinese SSN and SSBN build rates currently suggests the continuation 
of a moderate development plan.122 However, Washington should, at a minimum, 
develop contingency long-range planning for a determined PRC naval challenge, 
spearheaded by a new and formidable force of Chinese nuclear submarines.
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